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Roughly put, Ontic Structural Realism, as formulated by French and Ladyman [F&L], claims 
that at the most fundamental level of the world, only structures or forms (as opposed to objects) 
exist. F&L formulate Ontic Structural Realism in order to supplant Epistemic Structural Realism, 
which states that we can only know structure. According to F&L, epistemic structural realism, as 
a form of realism, cannot sufficiently respond to the pessimistic meta-induction as well as 
advancements in modern physics, i.e. quantum mechanics. In this paper, I will explain Ontic 
Structural Realism against the backdrop of Epistemic Structural Realism, and show why Ontic 
Structural Realism rules out the existence of anything but structure. 
2. The Pessimistic Meta-Induction 
Science is an ever-changing field, and thus the ontology it offers is also in constant flux. For 
example, Newton said that light consists of moving corpuscles, Fresnel thought that light was a 
wave that travelled through an ether, Einstein and Feynmann though that light behaves like a 
wave and other times like a particle, and Schwarz said that light behaves like a string.1 
According to the Pessimistic Meta-Induction, since throughout the history of science empirically 
successful theories have been updated, replaced, or abandoned, then inductively “it is very likely 
that the ontology of our currently accepted theories will also undergo radical revision.”2 In other 
words, the metaphysics implied by even our best scientific theories might be flawed. The target 
of the pessimistic meta-induction is Scientific Realism. There are different forms of Scientific 
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Realism, but broadly construed, it claims that our best scientific theories can actually tell us what 
the observable and unobservable physical world is like; as such, we should be realists about the 
ontology that science affords us. For example, if our best scientific theory of light tells us that it 
is a wave instantiated in an (albeit unobservable) ether, then we should admit ether into our 
ontology. However, if the pessimistic meta-induction is correct, then the scientific realist is in 
trouble. If science is subject to such constant change, then wouldn’t it be metaphysically and 
epistemically irresponsible to keep changing our ontology? Wouldn’t it be more rational to think 
that science is not a reliable guide to ontology, and thus suspend judgment about the ontological 
import of scientific theories or even deny the existence of, say, unobservables?  
Arguably, the pessimistic meta-induction rules out scientific realism; however, there is 
another form of realism that is in a position to accommodate the pessimistic meta-induction, 
namely, structural realism. Broadly construed, according to structural realism, though scientific 
theories are supplanted all the time (in virtue of their suspect ontologies), there is nevertheless 
continuity between successful scientific theories. However, the continuity holds between 
structure, not ontology. In the case of light, for example, the structural realist will say that almost 
everyone up to Schwarz (not Newton), explained light by the same mathematical equation, and 
so they agree on the same structure (the thought here is that the mathematical equation represents 
the structure, not that the equation is the structure of light).3 What these scientists disagree on, 
then, is the nature of light. Is it a particle, a wave in ether, a wave-particle, a field or a string? 
Taking the pessimistic meta-induction seriously, then, the structural realist will say that we 
should be irrealists about the metaphysical nature of light, but realists about the structure of light 
represented by the relevant mathematical formulae. Thus, we should discard, say, any 
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metaphysics of ether. According to the structural realist, then, the pessimistic meta-induction 
should show us that the project of science is about the discovery of relations or structures in the 
world, as opposed to understanding things in the world. 
Strictly speaking, structural realism as I have formulated it, does not rule the possibility that 
there is an ontology of light which science could eventually understand. According to one 
version of structural realism, namely, Epistemic Structural Realism, all we can know is structure. 
According to F&L, Epistemic Structural Realism is “‘epistemic’ because the central claim is that 
all that we know is this ‘form or structure’, whereas the ontological content, although retained, is 
unknowable.”4 As such, Epistemic Structural Realism does not rule out the possibility that 
structural relations have relata or that the structure is a structure of something, e.g. some type of 
substance. Though F&L think that Epistemic Structural Realism is on the right track (in virtue of 
emphasizing the importance of structure), they claim that it has not properly addressed the 
pessimistic meta-induction because it fails to address the essential issue about theory-change and 
ontology. The whole point of the pessimistic meta-induction is to show that because our theories 
constantly change we cannot accept the “ontological implications” of our scientific theories, and 
in claiming that all we can know is structure, epistemic structural realism just avoids the real 
problem. That is, it has only told us something about our epistemic capacities and what we 
should believe, as opposed to what we should do in the face of our ever-changing scientific 
metaphysics.                     
 Moreover, the suggested ontology of Epistemic Structural Realism is suspect in that it is 
similar to 17th century theories of substances and forms in that it posits something hidden that we 
cannot (at least now) fully comprehend (e.g. Locke’s real essences). Thus, Epistemic Structural 
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Realism is not even putting us in a position to (eventually?) discover a plausible metaphysics. 
According to French and Ladyman, however, there is a way of formulating structural realism 
such that one does not appeal to metaphysically suspect substances and forms, namely, by 
showing that structure is the only thing that exists—in other words, the realism is about structure, 
not objects. 
According to Ontic Structural Realism, structure is the only “thing” that exists. Hence, it also 
claims that structure is the only thing we can know—thus, it does not posit unknowable 
substances or essences. As formulated, however, Ontic Structural Realism faces some conceptual 
problems. In particular, in what sense can structure only exist, if there isn’t something that is 
structured? In other words, if structure is constituted by relations, then how can we have relations 
without relata, that, is the objects that the relations hold between? Given these considerations, 
the scientific realist might object to the ontic structural realist by claiming that ontic structure 
just implies that the objects posited by our theories actually exist. Thus, the scientific realist 
might concede that the ontic structural realist has just brought to our attention a fundamental 
piece of reality that we were neglecting (i.e. structure), but in the end, claim that structure proves 
that the observable and unobservable objects postulated by our scientific theories actually exist. 
According to F&L, however, we need to discard these concepts of objects or individuals (though 
we can still use the terms) and re-conceptualize ontology: “we regard the ontic form of SR 
[structural realism] as offering a reconceptualization of ontology, at the most basic metaphysical 
level, which effects a shift from objects to structures.”5 In particular, “a form of realism adequate 
to the physics needs to be constructed on the basis of an alternative ontology which replaces the 
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notion of object-as-individual/non-individual with that of structure in some form.”6   
3. Structure at the Quantum Level 
 In order for this re-conceptualization to be successful, F&L must offer a way of 
understanding electrons, elementary particles, and so on in “structural instead of individualistic 
terms.”7 This task is difficult because,  
If we consider the most successful of our (mature) current theories in metaphysical terms, 
then we discover a kind of metaphysical underdetermination in that the physics is compatible 
with a view of quantum objects as non-individuals – in the sense, as typically expressed, that 
they have ‘lost’ their identity – and also with a view of such objects as individuals.8  
 
The thought here is that quantum mechanics does not clearly dictate ontology; as such, there is 
way in which quantum mechanics can support Ontic Structural Realism or Scientific Realism—
thus, there is work for F&L to do.                
 Ultimately, F&L want to show that the “objects” of quantum physics are merely “heuristic” 
devices that scientists use in order to mathematically capture the structure that actually exists in 
the world.9 As such, at the end of the day objects are superfluous and thus disposable in our 
ontology. Consider the following example. We want to investigate flashes of light on a 
scintillation screen. Having performed the experiment in terms of classical physics, our 
observations of these flashes suggest that there are individual objects.10 However, when we carry 
over such observations to quantum physics (which is strictly speaking, the correct physics of the 
world), we generate the problem of underdetermination (see above). That is, the observations of 
the “individual” flashes no longer clearly dictate an ontology of individual quantum objects. 
However, this isn’t a problem for Ontic Structural Realism. Though there is underdetermination, 
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the underdetermination actually tells us that we can dispose of these individual objects. Given 
that quantum mechanics offers us an accurate understanding of the world, the mathematics and 
physics of quantum theory undermines our starting “package”—an ontology of individual 
objects in the classical domain.11 This isn’t to say that the classical metaphysics isn’t useful; we 
might need to use it as a starting point, but the objects posited in classical physics are ultimately 
disposable once we move to a quantum analysis of classical observations; thus, though we might 
imply or postulate objects in our initial scientific theories, ultimately, these “objects play only a 
kind of heuristic role.”12  More importantly, the reification of these objects in the classical 
domain is problematic because it fails to capture the nature of the explanandum in question. That 
is, we can only capture the complete nature of the individual flashes by appealing to the 
mathematical formulas (which represent structure) of quantum physics, which of course classical 
physics cannot appeal to. Thus, according to F&L, scientific realism is not only metaphysically 
problematic, but it is scientifically suspect given that it fails to capture the nature of the 
explanandum (even when it appeals to objects).13  
 In sum, according to Ontic Structural Realism, we ought only to accept the structures 
represented by our mathematical formulae in quantum physics. Moreover, when looking back at 
past successful scientific theories, we should see continuity between our current theories and past 
(refuted) theories in virtue of the structures they represent in their mathematical and physical 
formulae, not because of any continuity between objects posited, i.e. metaphysics. And if said 
formulas imply the existence of individual objects, we ought to treat such objects as mere 
artifacts of the theories. 
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